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MONEY AS PROPERTY: THE EFFECTS OF DOCTRINAL
MISALLOCATION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Maneesh Sharma*
By applying First Amendment jurisprudence to campaign finance measures, this
Note argues that the Supreme Court has misallocated campaign finance within its
doctrinal scheme. This doctrinal misallocation has stymied the ability of legisla-
tures to enact effective reforms to reduce the role of money in politics. This Note
argues that money in the political process more closely resembles property than
speech and should therefore be analyzed under a less stringent property review.
This Note concludes by proposing a standard of review developed from the Court's
property jurisprudence.
INTRODUCTION
"Money is property; it is not speech"1
Justice John Paul Stevens's simple statement in his concurring
opinion in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri presented a bold and daring
proposition. Since its seminal decision in Buckley v. Valeo,3 in which
the Supreme Court struck down political campaign expenditure
limits but allowed contribution limits, the Court has consistently
applied a First Amendment analysis to campaign finance measures.
The Court's doctrine is often summed up in a familiar catch-
phrase: "money equals speech., 4 Recently, the Court revitalized its
Buckley rationale in Randall v. Sorrell.5 Justice Stevens, however, ar-
gues that this analysis is wrong. For Justice Stevens, the use of
money in the political process does not properly fit within First
Amendment doctrine. Political contributions and expenditures
• The author is a 2007 graduate of the University of Michigan Law School and a
former contributing editor of the Journal of Law Reform. He currently is an Associate General
Counsel with the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural
Implements Workers of America ("UAW").
The opinions and positions stated in this Note are those of the author alone and are not
endorsed by the UAW.
1. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens,J., concurring).
2. Spencer A. Overton, Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property Characteristics of Political
Money, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1235, 1288 n.215 (2000) (describing Stevens concurrence as "ad-
vancing a daring argument").
3. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
4. E.JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, Buckley STOPS HERE: LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL STRANGLE-
HOLD ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 32 (1998).
5. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006) (invalidating Vermont's strict contribu-
tion and expenditure limits as too great a burden on First Amendment rights).
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better resemble property than money, and Justice Stevens proposes
that campaign finance regulations should be governed by the
Court's property jurisprudence.6 In effect, Justice Stevens argues
that campaign finance issues have been doctrinally misallocated.
This Note argues that, by applying First Amendment doctrine to
campaign finance measures, the Court has inserted itself into the
core of campaign finance regulations, as opposed to merely setting
the outer limits of regulation The Court's doctrinal misallocation
of campaign finance issues is similar to its now-defunct economic
substantive due process jurisprudence. The first Part of this Note
will describe the concept of doctrinal misallocation, using eco-
nomic due process as an example. The second Part of this Note
will argue that the Court has incorrectly applied First Amendment
doctrine to campaign finance cases, and that a property analysis is
more appropriate. This Note will show that a shift in doctrinal ap-
plication would reduce the level of scrutiny applied to campaign
finance measures, allowing legislatures to more freely regulate
money in politics. Finally, this Note will attempt to present a
proper standard of review developed from property cases.
I. DOCTRINAL MISALLOCATION
Doctrinal misallocation occurs when the Supreme Court places
an issue in the wrong doctrinal structure. In these situations, the
Supreme Court applies an analysis that does not naturally fit the
issue before it. In doing so, the Court often applies a doctrinal
analysis that offers greater protection than the issue deserves. This
misallocation has two major effects. First, it makes regulation of
that issue by the politically responsive branches far harder. Second,
it inserts the judiciary into the issue debate. It requires the judici-
ary to second-guess legislative decisions and forces proponents of
reform to pass their proposals not just through a legislature but
also through the courts. The courts begin to serve as a super-
legislature, reanalyzing a reform with little to no deference to the
legislature that passed it. This result can best be seen with an ex-
ample, and the most illustrative example is the Court's decision in
Lochner v. New York."
In Lochner, one of the most condemned decisions in United
States history,9 the Supreme Court invalidated a New York state
6. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 399.
7. See ROSENKRANZ, supra note 4, at 9-10.
8. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905).
9. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 750 (5th ed. 2005).
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statute setting maximum working hours for bakery employees.' °
The Court discovered a liberty to contract within the liberty inter-
ests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." The maximum hour statute unreasonably inter-
fered with this right to contract, and was therefore an invalid use of
the state's police powers.12
By finding the right to contract to be a fundamental right pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause, the Court brought its due
process jurisprudence to bear on economic regulations. The ques-
tion in Lochnerwas notjust whether a state had the authority under
its inherent police powers to pass this type of statute, but whether
due process rights were violated by this particular exercise of police
powers. Regulations of such essential economic relationships as
prices, wages, and working hours were placed under a substantive
economic due process analysis in the Court's doctrinal structure
and were scrutinized to determine whether they unduly interfered
with the liberty to contract. 13 In doing so, the Court rejected the
application of a less demanding standard under its state police
powers doctrine.'
4
The Lochner decision and its progeny garnered substantial criti-
cism over their period of vitality. The economic due process
doctrine, with its heightened degree of scrutiny, was widely criti-
cized for allowing the Court to second-guess the legislatures and to
enforce its preferred laissez-faire concept of governance. 15 As one
commentator wrote, "[T]he only general rule which could be
drawn from [Lochner and its progeny] was that types of regulation
of which the Court sufficiently disapproved were unconstitu-
tional.' ' 6 Legislative decisions were given little to no deference;
those statutory outcomes the courts approved survived, while those
it did not approve were invalidated.
10. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58.
11. Id. at 53. ("The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by
[the Fourteenth Amendment] ...
12. Id. at 58.
13. Robert L. Stern, The Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due Process, 4 VAND. L. REv.
446,448 (1951).
14. Generally, an exercise of a state's police power must be reasonably related to the
promotion of the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public. See Lochner, 198
U.S. at 53.
15. Id. Justice Holmes famously leveled this criticism against the Lochner majority when
he wrote in dissent: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics.... [A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissezfaire."
Id. at 75 (Holmes,J., dissenting).
16. Stern, supra note 13, at 448.
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Applying its substantive due process analysis to economic regula-
tions, the Court invalidated nearly two hundred such statutes
between 1905 and the mid-1930s.'7 But by the late 1930s, it became
obvious that the economic theory the Court was vindicating was no
longer sustainable.'8 Starting with its West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish'9
decision in 1937, the Supreme Court "thoroughly and quickly de-
molished" the constitutional doctrine of economic due process.2 0
In upholding a state minimum wage statute as a valid exercise of
police powers, the Court articulated a presumption of constitu-
tionality for use of the police powers.2 ' The Court did not discuss
the liberty to contract as something that required any additional
protections beyond those provided by the police powers analysis.2
Once the Court removed the special protections of substantive due
process from the analysis, the level of scrutiny applied to these
regulations necessarily declined. Fundamental liberties no longer
drove the analysis and economic regulations were no longer a sub-
stantive due process issue. The Court only concerned itself with the
question of whether the regulation was a reasonable, and not arbi-
trary or discriminatory, use of the state's police powers. 3 Economic
regulations were, in essence, relocated within the doctrinal scheme
from a substantive due process analysis to a much more deferential
analysis under its doctrine relating to the exercise of state police
powers.
Now, the Court is not only more deferential to legislatures on
economic regulations, it has "abdicated the field."24 The Supreme
Court has not invalidated an economic regulation on substantive
due process grounds since 1937.5 Understanding that legislatures,
and not courts, are better suited to balance the pluralist needs of
the community,26 the Court has rejected the use of substantive due
17. See STONE ET AL., supra note 9, at 755.
18. Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner ' Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 882 (1987)
("Once the Court's baseline shifted, its analysis became impossible to sustain.").
19. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
20. Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Rebural, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34, 36 (1962).
21. West Coast Hote4 300 U.S. at 397.
22. See id. at 391. ("Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the re-
straints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is
adopted in the interests of the community is due process.").
23. See Nebbia v. NewYork, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
24. McCloskey, supra note 20, at 38. The Supreme Court's doctrine is now so deferen-
tial to legislatures on economic regulation, that it would uphold such regulations when the
Court itself can hypothesize any reasonable set of facts and legislative purposes that would
sustain the legislation. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
25. STONE ET AL., supra note 9, at 765.
26. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537.
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process to impose the Court's own policy preferences. As the ma-
jority wrote in Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., "[t] he day is gone when
this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or
out of harmony with a particular school of thought."
2 7
The Lochner decision serves as a useful example of doctrinal mis-
allocation.2 8 By assigning economic regulations to an improper
doctrinal analysis, the Court expanded its role in our democratic
institutions. The use of substantive due process for economic regu-
lations artificially inflated the interest impaired by the
regulations-the liberty to contract-and allowed the Court to
wield its strongest tools to invalidate reasonable reform measures.
The Court set itself up as a barrier to effective legislative responses
to the labor and workplace needs of its constituents. The Court's
doctrinal misallocation hampered the attempts of legislators, or-
ganized labor, and workers' rights groups to change the power
imbalance between employers and employees. 29 The Court became
27. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488.
28. Economic due process is by no means the only example of doctrinal misallocation.
Abortion rights may be another. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), held that a woman has a
fundamental right to an abortion through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. This fundamental right is anchored in the concepts of personal autonomy and pri-
vacy, all of which are somehow protected by the guarantee of due process. See Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv.
375, 380 (1985). The Roe decision remains highly controversial. WHAT Roe v. Wade SHOULD
HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S Top LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL
DECISION (lack M. Balkin ed., 2005). By locating abortion rights within the substantive due
process doctrine, the Court effectively removes the issue from the legislature and places
itself directly into the heart of the debate. See generally John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:
A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Patrick M. Garry, A Different Modelfor the
Right to Privacy: The Political Question Doctrine as a Substitute for Substantive Due Process, 61 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 169 (2006). While the Court continues to apply this substantive due process
for abortion rights, see generally Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (invalidating Ne-
braska's partial birth abortion ban as an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion),
many scholars argue that the right to abortion properly belongs tinder the Court's equal
protection doctrine. See Ginsburg, supra; Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term,
Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1977); Sylvia A.
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991); Reva Siegel,
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261 (1992); Brief for the National Coalition Against Domestic
Violence as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490 (1989) (No. 88-605) (authored by David A. Strauss and Cass R. Sunstein). Placing abor-
tion rights under the equal protection doctrine would allow the courts to protect a woman's
right to access abortion while removing the Court itself as the final arbiter of abortion legis-
lation. Under equal protection, the Court protects the limits of legislative regulation while
allowing the legislature to properly serve as the arena for competing communal values to be
evaluated and weighed. See Ely, supra; Ginsburg, supra.
29. STONE ET AL., supra note 9, at 755.
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the guardian of the status quo, at a time that the nation's market
30needs and demands required anything but the status quo.
Doctrinal misallocation can do a great disservice. In those situa-
tions where the doctrinal analysis applied by the Court offers
greater scrutiny than the issue actually deserves, the Court invaria-
bly will serve to protect the status quo. The Court then provides an
unjustified special protection for the status quo. Doctrinal misallo-
cation, in this context, precludes legislatures from social
reorganizations to address constituent issues. Seen in light of the
deleterious effects of doctrinal misallocation, Buckley v. Valeo is di-
rectly related to Lochner.2
II. CAMPAIGN FINANCE UNDER FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
A. Buckley's Doctrinal Misallocation of
Campaign Finance Regulations
All modern campaign finance jurisprudence stems from Buckley
v. Valeo.3" The case involves a challenge to the 1974 Amendments to
the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"). 3 In response to a
substantial record of campaign finance abuses by federal candi-
dates, mostly by the Nixon Administration, Congress amended
FECA to create a more comprehensive and stringent campaign fi-
nance regulatory system.3' These amendments included limits on
contributions to federal candidates and limits on the amount that
federal candidates could spend on their campaigns.3' In a fractured
decision, the Court struck down the expenditure limits while up-
holding the contribution limits.
The outcome in Buckley was largely determined by the level of
scrutiny applied to the analysis by the Court.36 The level of scrutiny,
30. Id.
31. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 883-84 (arguing that Buckley is a direct descendant of
Lochner-type decisions to enforce the common law baseline over legislative regulations).
32. Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure
Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 887 (2005).
33. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976).
34. See Bryan R. Whittaker, Note, A Legislative Strategy Conditioned on Corruption: Regulat-
ing Campaign FinancingAfter McConnell v. FEC, 79 IND. LJ. 1063, 1069-70 (2004).
35. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7. The limits included $1,000 contribution limits on individual
donors, $1,000 expenditure limits on independent groups, and various candidate expendi-
ture limits. Id.
36. See Overton, supra note 2, at 1244. The issues raised in Buckley were so novel that it
was unclear what level of scrutiny the Court would apply when the case came before it.
Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance
Reform, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1045, 1053 (1985).
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in turn, was determined by the Court's answer to the question of
whether the expenditure and contribution limits directly burdened
First Amendment liberties or only incidentally limited those liber-
ties. If the limitations directly burdened speech, the Court would
apply its strictest level of scrutiny, invalidating any statute that
failed to serve a compelling interest and was narrowly tailored to
promote that interest.38 If, however, the limitations only inciden-
tally burdened speech interests, the Court would apply a less
exacting standard, usually allowing a statute that is closely drawn to
further a sufficiently important government interest.
39
The Court wasted little time in answering this question. The per
curium decision began its discussion with the statement that "l[t] he
Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area
of the most fundamental First Amendment activities .... The First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political ex-
pression .... ,4 0 The Court entirely rejected the argument that the
giving and spending of money for political communication was not
a pure form of expression subject to something less than the exact-
ing scrutiny required by the First Amendment.4' The majority
believed "that money is so strictly necessary to 'effective political
speech' that a restriction on money effectively constitutes a restric-
tion on speech."4 2 In this modern era of mass-media driven
campaigns, the raising and spending of large sums of money is "an
ever more essential ingredient of an effective candidacy."4 3 The
Court found no regulable, non-speech component to political
money, but instead determined that money and expression are so
interwoven in the campaign context that money effectively
amounts to speech.4 The majority believed that campaign finance
measures directly burden First Amendment liberties, falling
squarely within the Court's First Amendment doctrine.
After accepting that contribution and expenditure limitations
were fully First Amendment issues, the Court was required to
37. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
38. Overton, supra note 2, at 1244; see also RoSENKRANZ, supra note 4, at 35 ("[O]nce a
court decides that a speech regulation is subject to strict scrutiny, the prognosis is grim.").
39. Overton, supra note 2, at 1244.
40. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
41. Id. at 16-17.
42. Overton, supra note 2, at 1247.
43. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
44. Id. at 16 (rejecting the argument accepted by the D.C. Circuit below, Buckley v.
Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 840-41 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc)). The D.C. Circuit analogized this
case to United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), where the Court upheld a conviction for
burning a draft card on the reasoning that the act was not pure speech and the government
had strong interests in regulating the non-speech conduct of the defendant's action. Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821,840-41 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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analyze both sets of limitations under an exacting scrutiny. Buckley
struck down each provision that placed a ceiling on spending, say-
ing that a "primary effect of these expenditure limitations is to
restrict the quantity of campaign speech by individuals, groups,
and candidates.' 45 The majority applied the strictest level of scru-
tiny to these expenditure limits."6 In rejecting the government's
argument that there was a compelling interest in promoting politi-
cal equity through these expenditure limits, the Court famously
wrote, "the concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.
47
The Court did, however, uphold the contribution limits of the
1974 Amendments. 4Y While applying an exacting, yet less strict,
level of scrutiny to these limits, the Court held that the burden on
First Amendment rights was not as great for contribution limits. 49
As the contribution serves the symbolic interest of exhibiting sup-
port for a candidate, limits on the size of the contribution were
found not to reduce the symbolism expressed by the donation.50
The Court accepted the government's interest in reducing corrup-
tion and the appearance of corruption as sufficient justification for
these limits on speech.5' As long as the contribution limits were not
set so low as to have a dramatically adverse effect on a candidate's
ability to advocate her candidacy, contribution limits were held to
be ajustified impingement on First Amendment liberties.2
By applying the Court's First Amendment protections to cam-
paign finance provisions, Buckley stands as "one of the most vilified"
decisions in the Court's modem jurisprudence. A close examina-
tion of the Court's majority opinion leaves the reader wholly
unsatisfied with the reasoning. In place of a thorough examination
of the relationship between money and speech, the decision is
"marked more by reliance on the simple equation of money and
speech."54 The absolutist stance of its expenditure and contribution
limitations discussion is even more striking when read next to the
pragmatic approach to the other provisions under inspection in
45. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39.
46. Id. at 41-42.
47. Id. at 48-49.
48. Id. at 58.
49. Id. at 26.
50. Id. at 21.
51. Id. at 26.
52. See id. at 21.
53. Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1390, 1394 (1994) [hereinafter Political Equality].
54. Harold Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 345, 359 (1977).
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the case.5 5 With no in-depth discussion of the complicated relation-
ship between money and speech, the Court leaves us with a
"startlingly cavalier" decision .
The Buckley decision would have benefited from a greater discus-
sion of why First Amendment doctrine is properly applied to
campaign finance provisions. The Court's decision seems particu-
larly confused in its analysis. The Court focused its attention on
what the money can buy, and not on the money itself' 7 But the
regulations at issue were directed solely at the giving and spending
of the money.58 In essence, the Court asked the wrong question in
the case. Instead of asking whether money can be regulated when
there is an incidental effect on speech, the Court asked "whether
pure speech can be regulated where there is some incidental effect
on money."59 The Court focused on the destination, while the regu-
lation was directed at the mode of transportation.
Justice White, in dissent on these issues, was well aware of the
majority's misplaced emphasis. Justice White was the lone justice to
disagree with the position that these limitations violated First
Amendment rights.6° More notably, Justice White rejected the no-
tion that money equals speech. Writing that the majority contends
that "money talks," Justice White points out that "money is not al-
ways equivalent to or used for speech, even in the context of
political campaigns." 6' In fact, most of the funds raised in a politi-
cal campaign are used for non-communicative activities. 2 To
Justice White, the dangers of political corruption, defined to in-
clude tacit agreements for political favors in return for
contributions or expenditures, trump any incidental burden on
First Amendment interests.63 But the majority rejected taking this
55. Id. at 358.
56. Political Equality, supra note 53, at 1399.
57. SeeJ. Skelly Wright, Comment, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech ?, 85 YALE
L.J. 1001, 1008 (1976) [hereinafter Politics and the Constitution].
58. Id.Judge Wright wrote that in short, "the Court turned the congressional telescope
around and looked through the wrong end." Id.
59. Id. at 1007.
60. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,260 (1976) (White,J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); seeJ. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 612 (1982) [hereinafter Money and the
Pollution of Politics].
61. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 263.
62. ROSENKRANZ, supra note 4, at 40-41 ("A campaign's next dollar is more likely to be
spent on rent, transportation, or pizza than it is on a leaflet, a newspaper ad, or a television
spot.").
63. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 259-60.
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approach, and instead treated the First Amendment as a "near ab-
solute in the sphere of political debate.
6 4
Ironically, by expanding the First Amendment to cover cam-
paign finance provisions,r5 the Court enunciated principles that are
themselves "wholly foreign to the First Amendment."6 6 While the
majority cites all the usual First Amendment cases, as if there were
no doubt about their applicability, in reality, campaign finance
provisions do not properly fit in the Court's previous First
Amendment jurisprudence. 7 Essentially, the Court says that the
limitations on a candidate's use or receipt of money violate free
speech interests because such limits reduce the distance the candi-
date's message may travel. With less money, the candidate can buy
fewer television spots, leaflets, and newspaper ads."' But this rea-
soning confuses the intent of the First Amendment. The First
Amendment is meant to prevent content discrimination, 69 not
promote content amplification.
In one of his many celebrated passages, Justice Holmes ex-
pressed the principle of our "Free Speech Tradition"70 while
dissenting in Abrams v. United States":
But when men have realized that time has upset many fight-
ing faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundation of their own conduct that the ul-
timate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get it-
self accepted in the competition of the market.... That at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution."
64. Money and the Pollution of Politics, supra note 60, at 611.
65. See Stephanie A. Sprague, Note, The Restriction of Political Associational Rights Under
Current Campaign Finance Reform First Amendment Jurisprudence, 40 NEW ENG. L. REv. 947, 983
(2006) ("Until Buckley, money was not considered a form of protected political speech.").
66. See Money and the Pollution of Politics, supra note 60, at 613 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 48-49).
67. See id.
68. The reduction would primarily be in television advertising. As Senator Edward
Kennedy once said, "Like a colossus of the ancient world, television stands astride our politi-
cal system, demanding tribute from every candidate for public office .... Its appetite is
insatiable... " MELVIN I. UROFSKY, MONEY AND FREE SPEECH: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
AND THE COURTS 37 (2005).
69. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1405, 1408-09 (1986).
70. Id. at 1405 (crediting Harry Kalven with the label).
71. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
72. Id. at 630 (Holmes,J., dissenting).
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This "marketplace of ideas" concept of the First Amendment,
built on the influential writings ofJohn Stuart Mill,75 now sits as the
core of First Amendmentjurisprudence.
The First Amendment denies the state the ability to silence dis-
senting voices, and therefore its central principle is an equal
opportunity for all voices to be heard.74 As Professor Owen Fiss de-
scribes it, the Free Speech Tradition should be understood as a
protection to the street corner speaker.15 The street corner speaker
cannot be arrested solely because the police officer does not like
what the speaker is saying. 7 Government intervention "must not be
based on the content of the speech, or on a desire to favor one set
of ideas over another."
77
Rigorous First Amendment scrutiny, then, is only employed to
prevent discrimination against the message itself.7 This under-
standing of the First Amendment runs throughout the Court's
speech cases both before and after the Buckley decision. In Roth v.
United States, the Court wrote, "[T] he First Amendment was not
intended to protect every utterance.... The protection given
speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people." 9 In one of its most celebrated free speech cases,
the Supreme Court recognized "a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibi-
ted, robust, and wide-open. 80 In Texas v. Johnson, the Court wrote,
"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it
is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
73. See generallyJOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). Mill, in rejecting the idea that
a democratic government could suppress particular opinions, famously wrote:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the
human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the
opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of
the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as
great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by
its collision with error.
Id. at 33.
74. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment 43 U. CHI.
L. REv. 20 (1975). Professor Karst writes, "The principle of equality, when understood to
mean equal liberty, is not just a peripheral support for the freedom of expression, but rather
part of the central meaning of the First Amendment." Id. at 21 (quotations omitted).
75. Fiss, supra note 69, at 1408.
76. Id. at 1409.
77. Id.
78. Politics and the Constitution, supra note 57, at 1009.
79. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
80. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagree-
able."8 1 In its fullest embrace of the equality principle underlying
the First Amendment, 2 the Court announced:
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. To permit
the continued building of our politics and culture, and to as-
sure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are
guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from gov-
ernment censorship. The essence of this forbidden
censorship is content control."
The First Amendment, therefore, is "not the guardian of un-
regulated talkativeness," and freedom of speech is not an
unqualified right.8 4 The First Amendment protects against gov-
ernment censorship and content discrimination, ensuring an
"equality of status in the field of ideas."8 5
By applying its "blunderbuss formula that equates money and
speech," 6 Buckley ignores the distinction between regulating the
content of speech and regulating the quantity of speech8 7 No
showing was made that the expenditure and contribution limita-
tions censored particular viewpoints ss The Buckley Court did state
that these limitations reduce the number of issues discussed within
the campaigns, ° but the Court merely assumes this statement to be
true. The opinion offers no evidence to support this conclusion,
likely because there is none. In fact, studies show that increases in
the amount of money spent in campaigns do not expand the num-
ber of issues discussed; they merely increase the repetition of a
narrow number of issues.9°
Thus, "Buckley transformed the traditional bar against censorship
into something radically different: restrictive scrutiny of legislative
action meant to protect the citizenry from abuse of the rights of
81. Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
82. Karst, supra note 74, at 22.
83. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (citations omitted).
84. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 25-26 (1960).
85. Id. at 27. Meikeljohn goes on to say that "[a] ny such suppression of ideas about the
common good, the First Amendment condemns with its absolute disapproval. The freedom
of ideas shall not be abridged." Id. at 28.
86. Politics and the Constitution, supra note 57, at 1010.
87. See Money and the Pollution of Politics, supra note 60, at 633.
88. Politics and the Constitution, supra note 57, at 1009.
89. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
90. ROSENKRANZ, supra note 4, at 40.
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property."i" By assigning campaign finance measures to First
Amendment scrutiny, the Court may in fact be defeating First
Amendment purposes. Money in the political campaign process
merely determines the amplitude of one's message in the current
mass media society. In the name of protecting speech interests, the
Court hands monopolistic rights to campaign speech to the mon-
eyed elite." Those with money speak, those without it are silenced,
and those with little are drowned out. This result undermines the
equality principle of the First Amendment, thereby harming our
ability to self-govern. By allowing a small segment of society to
dominate political discourse through their dollars, we lose alterna-
tive voices, ideas, and eventually, leaders. 3
The greatest weakness of Buckley is that it ties the hands of Con-
gress to deal with this speech monopoly. The Court applies First
Amendment scrutiny to protect candidates' ability to effectively
campaign in today's mass media society. But this reasoning assumes
that expensive mass media campaigning is the natural, unchange-
able state of politics.94 The Court is right that expenditure and
contribution limits reduce the amount of television ads, leaflets,
fliers, newspaper ads, and other media that a candidate can pur-
chase. But this result is precisely what Congress intended.
Congress, with FECA and the 1974 Amendments, intended to
move the political campaign process away from the mass media
model, and towards a smaller scale, community-based model reli-
ant on volunteers, word of mouth, and personal contact.95 This
shift does nothing to affect the content of the candidate's speech,
but merely defines the process through which the speech will be
91. Brief of Amicus Curiae ReclaimDemocracy.Org in Support of Respondents at 5,
Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006) (No. 04-1528), 2006 WL 325189.
92. See David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Fi-
nance, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 236 (1991) (arguing that the distortive effects of wealth in
politics justifies campaign finance reform); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Un-
free Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949 (1995).
93. See Money and the Pollution of Politics, supra note 60, at 638.
94. Politics and the Constitution, supra note 57, at 1005.
95. See id. Again, it seems that only Justice White saw this point. In dissenting from the
majority's conclusion that the expenditure limits were unconstitutional,Justice White wrote:
The ceiling on candidate expenditures represents the considered judgment of Con-
gress that elections are to be decided among candidates none of whom has
overpowering advantage by reason of a huge campaign war chest.... This seems an
acceptable purpose and the means chosen a common-sense way to achieve it. The
Court nevertheless holds that a candidate has a constitutional right to spend unlim-
ited amounts of money, mostly that of other people, in order to be elected.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 265-66 (1976) (White,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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delivered. Why the First Amendment prevents Congress from de-
fining the campaign process in this way is a question left
unanswered by the decision.6
B. Effects of Doctrinal Misallocation of Campaign Finance Reform
Buckley's misallocation of campaign finance regulations within
the Court's doctrinal scheme has a number of negative effects.
Much like Lochner, the Court's misapplication of First Amendment
doctrine to these regulations puts the judiciary in the position of
overprotecting the status quo.97 Due to the heightened scrutiny of
campaign finance regulations, legislatures and reformers have little
room for innovation, while thejudiciary's own role in the debate is
increased. Perhaps because of the uncomfortable fit of campaign
finance measures in First Amendment doctrine, modern campaign
finance jurisprudence is clunky and often incoherent.98
The judiciary now stands as a great roadblock to campaign fi-
nance reform measures.99 Courts often reverse the long-fought-for
measures pushed by reform-minded legislators and groups. 0 The
courts are the final arbiters of campaign finance provisions, sitting
as a super-legislature to second-guess the means chosen by the leg-
islatures to deal with the growing amounts of money in politics,
and even, on some occasions, to second-guess the ends of such
regulations. The exacting standard of review allows courts to look
over the shoulders of legislatures, inserting judges into campaign
finance debates.1"" Courts do not merely set government's limits in
reform efforts; they are the final decision-makers for the vitality of
any campaign finance reform. Campaign finance legislation is im-
96. Political Equality, supra note 53, at 1399.
97. See id.; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae ReclaimDemocracy.Org, supra note 91, at 6-
7.
98. See Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance, the Parties and the Court: A Comment on Colo-
rado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Elections Commission, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 91, 97-105 (1997); Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, LongLive Buckley: The New
Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 31 (2004) [hereinafter Buckley is Dead]; Richard L. Hasen, The Newer Incoherence: Compe-
tition, Social Science, and Balancing in Campaign Finance Law After Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHrO
ST. L.J. 849 (2007) [hereinafter The Newer Incoherence]; Spencer Overton, Restraint and Re-
sponsibility: Judicial Review of Campaign Finance Reform, 61 WASH. & LEE I. REv. 663, 666-67
(2004) [hereinafter Restraint and Responsibility].
99. One commentator describes the judiciary as a Wizard of Oz-style giant, dancing tree
in center field, swaying back and forth to snatch home runs. E.Joshua Rosenkranz, Introduc-
tion to IF Buckley FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN
POLITIcs 4 (E.Joshua Rosenkranz ed., 1999) [hereinafter IF Buckley FELL].
100. See id.; see also ROSENKRANZ, supra note 4, at 9.
101. See ROSENKRANZ, supra note 4, at 10.
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mediately challenged in court after passage.102 Proponents must
wait until judicial pronouncement to know whether the legislation
is an acceptable reform measure.
Those provisions that have managed to survive judicial review
have failed to alter the massively expensive political campaign
process.0 3 Money increasingly continues to flow into campaigns,
especially from very wealthy donors.0 4 Unlike most failed regula-
tory schemes, however, this failure is in large part due to
constitutional doctrine. 10 5 By striking down expenditure limits for
speech reasons but allowing contribution limits, the Court largely
gutted FECA, which relied on the integrated system of both ex-
penditure and contribution limitations.' °6 The Court thus binds the
hands of reformers and cuts down effective reform legislation, all
in the name of a tortured application of its First Amendment doc-
trine.
The existing First Amendment analysis of campaign finance is-
sues provides little guidance to judges of how much speech must
be regulated for the court to invalidate laws.' 7 Judges must thus
rely on their own assumptions about politics.'0 8 Their decisions are
then based on judges' own views on money in politics, though they
are cloaked in First Amendment doctrine, which is unsuited for a
discussion of democratic values.'09 This reliance on individual
judges' assumptions of the effect of money inevitably leads to in-
consistent holdings, as assumptions vary between judges."0
This state of affairs begs for a standard of review that is far more
deferential to the legislature's judgments than First Amendment
doctrine allows. Legislators are in a far better position to deter-
mine the dangers money creates for the political process, and
clearly, legislators are closer to the nexus of money and politics
than federal judges. But the Court has struggled with what level of
102. Restraint and Responsibility, supra note 98, at 665-66.
103. See generally UROFSKY, supra note 68, at 60-88 (outlining the failure of campaign fi-
nance reform since 1976); Frank J. Sorauf, What Buckley Wrought, in IF Buckley FELL, supra
note 99, at 11, 11-62.
104. SeeJeffrey H. Birnbaum, A Growing Wariness About Money in Politics, WASH. POST,
Nov. 29, 2005, at Al.
105. Sarouif, supra note 103, at 12 ("In [the case of campaign finance reform], the fail-
ures of the regulatory structures in the nation and the states... are in many ways the results
of First Amendmentjurisprudence.").
106. BURT NEUBORNE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM & THE CONSTITuYrION: A CRITICAL
LOOK AT Buckley v. Valeo 18 (1998), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/
subpages/cfrl .pdf.
107. Restraint and Responsibility, supra note 98, at 667.
108. Id. at 666.
109. Id. at 666-67.
110. Id. at 667.
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deference to give the legislature under its campaign finance juris-
prudence."' For example, while the Buckley Court could have
deferred to Congress's judgment that independent expenditures
posed as much, if not a greater, threat of corruption than contribu-
tions, it relied on its own "armchair empiricism" to invalidate that
provision.12
On the other hand, until a recent shift, the Court seemed to be
moving towards a more deferential standard in campaign finance
cases. In what Richard Hasen had dubbed the "New Deference
Quartet," the Court lowered the bar for constitutionally adequate
legislation in four separate cases."l3 These cases combined to
"(1) reduce[] the evidentiary burden that the government must
meet to show that a law is necessary to combat corruption or its
appearance [and] (2) relax[] the level of scrutiny applicable to
reviewing campaign finance regulation." 14 For instance, in the
Shrink Missouri decision, the Court, in upholding rather low state
contribution limits, made clear that the standard of review for con-
tributions was lower than that for expenditure limits,"l5 the
contribution limitations standard being more stringent than in-
termediate scrutiny but less stringent than strict scrutiny.1 6 The
Court in Shrink Missouri accepted a rather light record amassed by
the State as sufficient evidence of the appearance of corruption to
justify the low contribution limits. 117 The evidence was primarily an
affidavit from a Missouri legislator who stated that there was a "real
potential to buy votes" and newspaper accounts suggesting possible
corruption."8 With this level of deference, some commentators felt,
after this decision, that almost all contributions limits would be
upheld in the future."9
111. Briffault, supra note 98, at 103.
112. Id.
113. Hasen, supra note 32, at 891. These cases were Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee, 533 U.S. 431 (2001), Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003),
and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
114. Buckley is Dead, supra note 98, at 32.
115. Shrink Mo.,528 U.S. at 388.
116. Overton, supra note 2, at 1248; see also Kenneth G. Potter, Note, Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC: Political Speech of the Common Voter is Promoted Through Campaign
Finance Reform, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 151, 172 (2002) ("[T]he Court utilized a review
stricter than intermediate scrutiny.").
117. Hasen, supra note 32, at 892.
118. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 393.
119. See WRITING REFORM: A GUIDE TO DRAFTING STATE & LOCAL CAMPAIGN




In Randall v. Sorrell, however, the Court snapped back from this
deferential posture. 2 0 The Court reviewed a comprehensive cam-
paign finance package passed in Vermont that included
expenditure limits and strict contribution limits. 2 ' Applying stare
decisis, the Court struck down the expenditure limits, presumably
closing the door on that type of reform under First Amendment
analysis.2 2 Even more significantly, Randall additionally struck
down the contribution limits.
23
By holding the contribution limits too low to satisfy First
Amendment concerns, the Court revitalized Buckley, and, most
likely, killed the New Deference Quartet.'2 In fact, as Justice
Souter's dissent points out, the contribution limit analysis relies
entirely on Buckley, while distinguishing the case from Shrink Mis-
souri.25 Further, while Shrink Missouri clearly called for deference to
the level of contribution limit set by the legislature, the plurality in
Randall found it necessary to exercise "independent judicial judg-
ment" to determine whether these limits were too low to allow a
candidate to amass the necessary funds to effectively campaign for
office.' 26 Finding these limits were prohibitively low, the Court de-
clared the limits unconstitutionally burdensome on First
Amendment interests.'
27
With Randall v. Sorrell, the Court returns to its role of second-
guessing the legislature's decisions on campaign finance regulatory
needs, replacing the judgments of those who actually campaign
with the assumptions of federal judges who do not. Throwing the
decisions on campaign finance measures into the hands of un-
elected judges has a significant effect on legislatures. With no
deference given to their judgments by judges, legislators are un-
clear as to what measures are constitutionally permissible.
2
Legislators may then lack the political will to pass reform-minded
legislation. 29 Courts thus may not only second-guess legislation that
has already been passed, but preclude legislation from passing in
the first place.
Shifting campaign finance issues from a First Amendment analy-
sis under the Court's doctrinal scheme to a property analysis may
120. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2485-87 (2006).
121. Id. at 2485-87.
122. Id. at 2484, 2489.
123. Id. at 2485.
124. The Newer Incoherence, supra note 98, at 10, 16-17.
125. Randal4 126 S. Ct. at 2512-13 (SouterJ., dissenting).
126. Id. at 2492.
127. Id. at 2499.
128. Restraint and Responsibility, supra note 98, at 667.
129. Id.
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provide a way out of this judicially controlled campaign finance
system. An irony created by the Court's doctrinal misallocation of
campaign finance is that the Court actually allows campaign fi-
nance to be regulated by property interests. By inoculating
elections based on existing "distributions of wealth and entitle-
ments" from congressionally chosen regulations, the Court
enforces a regulatory system governed by property rights. 30 The
distribution of wealth is maintained by property law.'3' The Court
thus wields its First Amendment doctrine as a sword to protect a
political process regulated by the status quo distribution of prop-
erty rights, thereby actually defeating the equality underpinnings
of the First Amendment.12 If the Court allows campaign finance to
be regulated by property rights, it should apply a property rights
analysis to campaign finance regulations.
III. CAMPAIGN FINANCE AS A PROPERTY ISSUE
For proposing such a large idea, Justice Stevens's concurring
opinion in Shrink Missouri provides very little reasoning in support
of his bold proposition. He states that "[s] peech has the power to
inspire," while money empowers one to hire laborers to perform
certain tasks.'13 As he writes, " [i] t does not follow, however, that the
First Amendment provides the same measure of protection to the
use of money to accomplish such goals as it provides to the use of
ideas to achieve the same results."'3 4 To Justice Stevens, the Consti-
tution provides adequate protection to "the individual's interest in
making decisions about the use of his or her property.' 35 Justice
Stevens sums up his position on campaign finance reform by saying
that "[t]he right to use one's own money to hire gladiators, or to
fund 'speech by proxy,' certainly merits significant constitutional
130. Political Equality, supra note 53, at 1399.
131. See id. ("[L]aw defines property interests; it specifies who owns what, and who may
do what with what is owned.").
132. See Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. Rav. 2470, 2478-2479 (1997).
A ceiling on expenditures by citizens, much like the one on contributions, would
have placed the poor on the same footing as the wealthy: neither group would have
any special ability to promote the candidate's electoral interests. In that sense, the
limitation on expenditures, like the one on contributions, should have been under-
stood to satisfy the First Amendment, indeed to further its democratic aspirations.
Id.





protection. These property rights, however, are not entitled to the
same protection as the right to say what one pleases."
3 6
While light on the reasoning for why campaign money is better
analyzed under the Court's property rights doctrine than its free-
dom of speech doctrine, the concurrence's proposition is
insightful. Campaign finance regulations are more akin to regula-
tions of property than to burdens on speech interests.
Property is defined by Black's Law dictionary as "[a] ny external
thing over which the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment are
exercised." 37 The classical view defines property rights as "one per-
son's full and exclusive right to use, enjoy, and transfer a tangible
thing." m A more expansive view of property suggests that it can be
understood as an "aspect of relations between people."33 In this
light, property consists of decision-making authority, where author-
ity "refers to the role of property as a claim that other people
ought to accede to the will of the owner.' 4 Property rights assign
something to one's control, resolving any competing claims over
that thing. Property is scarce and unevenly distributed.14 ' Due to
competing inconsistencies of ownership, property rights only ex-
tend until they interfere with other owners' property interests. 42 As
property involves decision-making authority, it may be alienated.
43
Political money,144 even with whatever connection to expressive
communications it has, seems closer to property than speech. Po-
litical money clearly falls within the Black's Law definition of
property, but it also fits the more expansive view of property. Politi-
cal money is controlled by the owner, and the owner of the dollars,
for the most part, has decision-making authority over the money
that all others must accede to. There are no recognizable competing
claims to an owner's possession of political money. Speech cannot be
thought of as a similar decision-making liberty. Speech is expression,
and the right to free speech is a right of self-expression. This right
136. Id. at 399.
137. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1252 (8th ed. 2004).
138. Emily Sherwin, 7ivo- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1075,
1079 (1997).
139. C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA.
L. REv. 741, 742 (1986).
140. Id. at 742-43.
141. Overton, supra note 2, at 1259.
142. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Powers, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61 (1964) (arguing that
property "is the end result of a process of competition among inconsistent and contending
economic values").
143. Baker, supra note 139, at 744.
144. Professor Overton uses this term to differentiate money within the political process
from money generally. Overton, supra note 2, at 1243 n.26. I adopt the same term here.
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of self-expression does not work to resolve competing claims in the
same way property rights do.
Political money is also alienable. It is transferred from contribu-
tor to candidate and from candidate to advertiser. An owner may
transfer her whole lot of political money to one candidate, or di-
vide it among several. A speaker can do no such thing. Speech is
not alienable; it cannot be transferred from one to another, even
though Buckley seems to imply so. Furthermore, as discussed in
greater detail below, political money is scarce and unevenly dis-
tributed. Speech is readily and equally available to all.
Property and speech rights are treated differently within the
Court's doctrinal scheme. 45 Over the past century, judicial vigi-
lance of First Amendment violations has increased in nearly
parallel fashion to its deference to legislatures on property regula-
tions.' 46 The First Amendment now stands as a far greater bar to
government intrusion than do the Property Clauses found in the
Fifth Amendment. This differentiation is justified by the divergent
natures of property and speech.
One major difference between property and speech that may
justify the disparate judicial treatments is that property is scarce
and unevenly distributed. At any given time, an individual only has
access to a limited amount of personal property.'47 Speech, on the
other hand, is not a finite commodity; people's ability to express
themselves is generally easily accessible and unlimited. 48 Speech is
naturally endowed to the speaker, and everyone naturally has an
equal ability to speak. 49 Property, however, is not a natural endow-
ment and is hence unequally distributed across society.150
Recognizing the issues of scarcity and distribution inherent in
political money would greatly increase judicial deference to legisla-
tive decision-making. 5' Courts have competence to enforce First
145. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust; 59 U. CHI.
L. REv. 41, 59-87 (1992); Frank I. Michelman, Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional Method,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 91 (1992).
146. Overton, supra note 2, at 1252.
147. Id. at 1259.
148. Id.; see alsoJonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1101, 1143
(1993).
149. Overton, supra note 2, at 1259.
150. Baker, supra note 139, at 787 n.85 ("No holdings flow solely from people's natural
assets. Holdings flow from, among other things, the exercise of natural assets within a spe-
cific cultural and legal structure.").
151. See Michelman, supra note 145, at 95 ("Judges'] protection takes the form of
more-or-less censorious review of laws infringing on liberties of one or another class. There
should be no great surprise in finding variation in the forms and degrees of such review,
depending on which classes of liberty are in question.").
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Amendment rights, which are ubiquitous and evenly distributed,'
and thus, deference to legislative decision-making is not necessary.
Courts merely need to maintain the equality of First Amendment
rights, ensuring that all viewpoints are heard and that legislation
does not silence any voice. Additionally, a legislature may be ill-
suited to properly balance First Amendment interests, as its major-
ity tendencies often inadequately account for minority or
unpopular viewpoints. 5 Strict scrutiny enables courts to closely
examine legislation to ensure that the legislature has not devalued
minority viewpoints.
Legislatures, however, are competent to regulate property that is
scarce and unevenly distributed.154 Decisions on regulations for
scarce and unevenly distributed resources are policy based, requir-
ing the balancing of competing needs of society. Also, property
regulation is aided by the fact that property values are easily quan-
tifiable, providing objective measurements for the legislature to
employ in its decision-making.5 5 Courts are then better served to
defer to legislative decisions on property regulations, only stepping
in when the legislature has overstepped its constitutional bounds.
Political money, like other property, is a finite commodity un-
evenly distributed within society. People are not naturally endowed
with political money. To apply First Amendment protection to po-
litical money ignores the issues of scarcity and uneven distribution
inherent with political money and assumes that the commodity is
as freely available as speech. 156 Therefore, it makes little sense to
apply First Amendment doctrine to political money. Removal, or
restriction, of campaign finance regulation in an attempt to equal-
ize the use of political money merely entrenches the monopoly the
moneyed elite holds over the political process.
A second possible reason for the different treatment of property
and speech under constitutional doctrine is that property rights
are defined by the relation of the property to neighboring prop-
erty. A property owner's "full enjoyment" of the use of his property
is limited by the enjoyment of his neighbor's use of her property.'57
An owner's freedom of choice concerning the use of his property
can only extend to the point where the use directly conflicts with
152. SeeOverton, supra note 2, at 1259.
153. See id. at 1260 ("[C]onventional wisdom holds that government cannot reliably,
and therefore should not, measure the value of expression ...
154. Id. at 1259.
155. Id. at 1259-60.
156. Id. at 1261.
157. Sax, supra note 142, at 61.
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another owner's use of her property.'58 A fundamental function of
law is to orderly resolve these conflicting interests. 159 Legal restric-
tions placed on the free use of one's property promote property
ownership as a whole by preventing one property owner from
dominating other people's property interests." Regulation also
prevents the use of one's property to the detriment of another's
non-property interest.1
6'
In resolving these conflicts, the state must choose the proper
balance and decide which interest to favor.6 2 Legislatures are bet-
ter positioned than courts to strike this balance.6 3 Legislatures,
being democratically responsive, are suited to weigh the different
interests of constituents, determine the value of each interest to
society, and develop policy. Courts are not institutionally compe-
tent to balance conflicting interests in this way. Courts are effective
at determining when a right is improperly infringed, but if a valid
use of one's property conflicts with someone else's use of their
property, or some greater societal interest, the courts are not the
best venue to resolve these conflicts.'6 Judges, therefore, largely
defer to legislative property regulations.' 65
The same concerns do not exist for speech. Speech interests do
not carry the interference concerns that property rights do. 66 Con-
flicting speech interests do not have to be regulated by the state-
in fact, these interests should be encouraged. The equality princi-
ple of the First Amendment promotes the airing of all viewpoints,
and eventually, many of these viewpoints will conflict. But this con-
flict does no harm to the individual's speech interest, unlike
interference in the property context. Speech interests similarly
rarely interfere with non-speech interests. 67 Put simply, one's
158. Baker, supra note 139, at 780.
159. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedra4 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1090 (1972). With no legal
framework to resolve these conflicts, regulation is left to "might makes right." Id.
160. See Overton, supra note 2, at 1263-64.
161. Id. Examples may include the shopkeeper's exclusion of patrons based on race, id.,
the release of toxins into drinking water supplies, or other conservation interests, see Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 942
(1985).
162. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 159, at 1090; see also Rose-Ackerman, supra
note 161, at 951 ("Restrictions on ownership and use will sometimes be effective second-best
substitutes for more flexible, incentive-based systems of externality control.").
163. SeeOverton, supra note 2, at 1264-65.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 1250.
166. Id. at 1264.
167. There are, of course, exceptions, such as speech meant to incite violence, hate
speech, or libel, but these exceptions make up only a small segment of speech. Additionally,
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speech interests are not limited by other people's speech interests.
Hence, the interference of speech interests is not seen as unfair or
illegitimate, as it is in the property analysis9" The courts, therefore,
have no reason to defer to a legislature's judgment on speech regu-
lation. In fact, speech regulations, which do not promote speech
rights as a whole, should be viewed skeptically by the courts.'69
Speech regulations actually harm the speech interests of society at
large, and the courts are therefore justified in applying strict scru-
tiny in these cases to ensure speech interests are not being
regulated due to their content.
By contrast, political money does raise the interference concerns
we see with property.7' The influence of money in politics creates a
substantial opportunity for political money to interfere with the
interests of others. The interests of certain segments of society may
be devalued, or others overvalued, by injecting large sums of
money into the process. For example, a quid pro quo exchange of
rent-seeking legislative favors for political money would unfairly
and illegitimately interfere with larger societal interests. Due to
these interference concerns, the use of political money is restricted
by such regulations as bribery laws and contribution limits. 7 '
Therefore, control of political money is defined by outside inter-
ests,just as with property and unlike with speech.
72
The preceding discussion shows that political money resembles
property far more than speech, and as such, raises issues similar to
those in property, justifying a more deferential standard of review
by courts. But what standard should apply? Justice Stevens's con-
currence provides little guidance. 3 Even Stevens acknowledges,
however, that money in politics does in some way touch on political
speech, and therefore requires greater protection by the courts
than ordinarily given property interests. 74 The following Part will
try to craft a possible standard from existing property doctrine.
courts will often defer to legislative judgments on restrictions of these exceptions. See Sulli-
van, supra note 92, at 951.
168. Overton, supra note 2, at 1266-67.
169. See id. at 1265.
170. Id. at 1266.
171. See id. at 1268.
172. Id. at 1269 ("[O]ne cannot claim the same natural birthright to dominion over her
political money as she might to her speech.").
173. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Speech About Political Candidates: The Unin-
tended Consequences of Three Proposals, 24 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47, 60 (2000).
174. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 n.* (2000) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); see also Overton, supra note 2, at 1285.
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IV. A PROPERTY REVIEW OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE MEASURES
A shift in the doctrinal analysis of campaign finance measures
from First Amendment to property jurisprudence raises valid con-
cerns that the new standard of review would enhance the
legislature's ability to regulate anyone who pays for communica-
tion, as opposed to speaking themselves, though a property
analysis would surely be more deferential than a First Amendment
analysis. 7 6 Still, it does not necessarily have to be the case that the
legislature's ability to regulate all sorts of other communications
where money transfers are involved would expand so broadly. A
standard may be crafted that allows for an analysis of political
money as property that is properly deferential to legislatures with-
out abdicating the field.
Two of Justice Stevens's opinions serve as helpful starting points.
The first is his concurrence in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 177 and
in fact Justice Stevens cited to this opinion in his Shrink Missouri178
concurrence. Moore involved a challenge to a single-family home
zoning requirement that forbid a grandmother to house her two
grandsons, who were first cousins but not brothers. 7 1 While the
majority invalidated the zoning restriction under Due Process, 8 °
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, believed the question
presented by the case was whether the ordinance was a "permissi-
ble restriction on appellant's right to use her own property as she
sees fit." 8' Justice Stevens, while recognizing that zoning ordi-
nances diminished individual property rights, said that these
ordinances did not extinguish those rights, 82 but the city was still
required to show that the ordinance was "substantiall1y] relat[ed]
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare[.]"J 8 3 To
Justice Stevens, this ordinance did not fulfill that requirement and
175. Volokh, supra note 173 at 58 (arguing that "the government would acquire broad
power to control[,]" among other things, "newspapers, book publishers, [and] directors").
176. See Sprague, supra note 65, at 983 ("If the Supreme Court analyzed money spent
on campaigns as a property issue, rather than a speech issue, the Court could more easily
uphold campaign finance reform laws against constitutional attack."); see also, Stephanie
Pestorich Manson, Note, When Money Talks: Reconciling Buckley, the First Amendment, and
Campaign Finance Reform, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1109, 1114 (2001) ("This 'money is prop-
erty, not speech' argument would permit a more lenient level of scrutiny for campaign
reform measures than the Buckley standard.").
177. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513-21 (1977) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
178. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 398-99 (Stevens,J., concurring).
179. Moore, 431 U.S. at 496-97.
180. Id. at 498-506.
181. Id. at 513 (Stevens,J, concurring).
182. Id. at 513-14.
183. Id. at 520.
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was therefore an unconstitutional taking.18 4 This opinion is signifi-
cant as it presents a model of review that still vigilantly protects
property rights, at least in certain contexts. Property owners have a
right to use their property as they see fit. The state's police powers
do not allow the state to unquestionably restrict the free usage of
one's property, as the restriction must promote a government in-
terest. As Justice Stevens wrote in his Shrink Missouri concurrence,
the ordinance in East Cleveland raised "important constitutional
concerns."'8 5 He also wrote in East Cleveland that the interest had to
be substantially related to promoting the general welfare.""' For
Stevens, it seems that the government interest must be more than
just legitimate-somewhere closer to substantial. 8 7 This require-
ment, of course, cannot be the case for all zoning ordinances, or
other restrictions on property, so more is needed for a comprehen-
sive standard."
The other important opinion by Justice Stevens is his majority
opinion in Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc. 89 American Mini
Theaters involved Detroit zoning ordinances forbidding new adult
movie theaters from operating within certain limits of other adult
stores and residential areas.' 90 Stevens, writing for the majority, up-
held the ordinances in the face of a First Amendment challenge.8 '
While ultimately accepting the validity of the ordinances, the ma-
jority opinion was sensitive to the First Amendment issues involved.
Stevens wrote that the zoning ordinances may not be motivated
by displeasure with the content of the theaters' expression. 92 Jus-
tice Stevens found that the burden on First Amendment rights was
not too great, since the ordinances only limited where adult films
could be exhibited.9 3 He did say, however, that the case would be
very different if the ordinances "had the effect of suppressing, or
greatly restricting access to, lawful speech."8 94 Thus, the decision
recognized that property regulations that touch on free speech
rights cannot ignore that First Amendment aspect. The state can-
not use its property regulations to eliminate certain speech
184. Id. at 521.
185. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399 (2000) (Stevens,J., concurring).
186. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 514 (Stevens,J., concurring).
187. See id. at 515-21.
188. It seems as though Justice Stevens found this zoning ordinance to be particularly
egregious, as it prevented a grandmother from sheltering her two grandsons, solely because
they were cousins and not brothers. See Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 399 (Stevens,J, concurring).
189. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
190. Id. at 52.
191. Id. at 73.
192. Id. at 64.
193. Id. at 71.
194. Id. at 71 n.35.
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interests. A property analysis of political money then would not
allow the legislature to ban all expenditures and contributions, as
this ban would greatly restrict access to lawful speech.
Another particularly important case for review is Walters v. Na-
tional Association of Radiation Survivors.195 In Walters, the Court
upheld a $10 attorney fee limit for counsel representing claimants
before the Veterans Affairs Administration, denying that such a
limit deprived claimants of due process.1 96 The majority said that
the attorney fee limitation was justified in order to maintain the
non-adversarial process that Congress established for the adjudica-
tion of veterans' benefits. 97 The use of one's property-here
money-even when it implicates First Amendment issues, may be
restricted to maintain a process that Congress has judged to be
proper.'98 Congress determined that veterans' benefit disputes are
best resolved non-adversariallyy9 and hired attorneys would distort
this adjudicatory process by making the hearings more like trials.
To prevent this distortion, Congress placed a limit on the amount
of money a claimant may spend on an attorney.00 The Court de-
ferred to this judgment, in essence saying that Congress is better
suited to determine what process is best.
20 '
Some commentators have said that this ruling effectively un-
dermined the logic of Buckley.202 As Professor Baker wrote, "Walters
puts a financial limit on a person's right to speak to the govern-
ment within the context of an institution, like an electoral process,
that is specifically designed and created by the government."20 3 In
fact, Justice Stevens, in dissent, even analogized the fee limitation
to an expenditure limit.2 4 The electoral process is designed, im-
plemented, and regulated by the state. The state thus has an
interest in maintaining an undistorted process, and it may set re-
strictions to do so. °o These restrictions may include limits on the
195. Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
196. Id. at 334.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 323, 334-35 (stating that whatever burdens are placed on claimants' First
Amendment rights were outweighed by the Government's interest in maintaining the proc-
ess).
199. Id. at 324.
200. Id. at 326.
201. Id.
202. See Baker, supra note 139, at 758 n.36.
203. Id.
204. Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 364 n.13 (1985) (Ste-
vensJ., dissenting).
205. See Politics and the Constitution, supra note 57, at 1004 (asking: "To what extent does
[money] poison the political process? ... (And] what may the people, acting through Con-
gress, do about it?").
[VOL. 41:3
Money as Property
use of political money. The courts should apply a deferential stan-
dard to allow Congress to determine the best way to maintain the
integrity of its process. But the courts may not be completely def-
erential, as they may not allow a ban on access to lawful speech or
too great a restriction on that access.
The Court has actually already employed an analysis similar to the
one just described in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.0 6 That
case was a challenge to a Michigan statute prohibiting corporations
from using corporate treasury money to make independent expen-
ditures. , The Court upheld the restriction on corporate
independent expenditures. 2° Though the decision stands as some-
thing of an anomaly, rarely discussed in contribution or expenditure
limitations cases, °2 9 Austin not only upheld an expenditure limit for
the first time, but it did so at a time when the Court was largely skep-
tical of campaign finance restrictions.210 Even more striking was the
Court's discussion of the compelling interest served by the statute.
Campaign finance measures that have survived judicial scrutiny,
both before and after Austin, have been held to serve the compel-
ling interest of preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption, with corruption understood to be quid pro quo cor-
ruption. 21 But in Austin, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,
said:
Regardless of whether this danger of 'financial quid pro quo'
corruption may be sufficient to justify a restriction on inde-
pendent expenditures, Michigan's regulation aims at a
different type of corruption in the political arena: the corro-
sive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
212
This holding is a radical expansion of the Court's concept of
corruption, both before and after the Austin decision. The quid
pro quo concept of corruption is aimed at preventing individual
206. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
207. Id. at 654-55.
208. Id. at 660-61.
209. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, A PatternIess Mosaic: Campaign Finance and the First
Amendment after Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 381, 383 (1992) (suggesting that Austin may be an
aberration).
210. See Buckley is Dead, supra note 98, at 40-42.
211. See generally, McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Fed. Elec-
tion Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377
(2000); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
212. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60 (citations omitted).
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government actors from trading political favors for contributions.
2 '3
Buckley actually struck down the independent expenditure provi-
sion of FECA partly because it claimed that quid pro quo
corruption was not a concern with independent expenditures. 4
The concept of corruption articulated in Austin seems aimed not at
the individual, but at the process itself. Immense aggregations of
wealth do not have a corrosive and distorting effect on individuals,
but on the electoral process as a whole. Seen this way, Austin is the
same as Walters. Austin allows Congress to limit corporations' use of
their own wealth within the electoral process to prevent the distor-
tion of the process Congress created. We even see a similar level of
deference. While the majority claims to apply strict scrutiny review,
it actually uses something less stringent. The Court accepts Michi-
gan's distorting effects of aggregated wealth as a compelling
interest without any evidence of such an effect. It defers to the
state's judgment that there was a potential for such corruption
which warranted the restriction. The Court also does not seem to
closely examine whether the restriction is narrowly tailored (al-
though it does state that the restriction is only aimed at
corporations, which have particularly large aggregations of wealth
that have the greatest potential for corruption) .26 Additionally, the
Court seems satisfied that there are other avenues for corporations
to influence elections, including setting up a segregated fund for
political expenditures that can only accept contributions from in-
dividuals connected to the corporation.2 1 '7 But the Court makes no
showing that these other avenues are adequate for effective advo-
cacy. Unlike Randall v. Sorrell, for instance, where the Court looked
to see whether the contribution limits were too low to allow for ef-
fective campaigning, the Austin Court did not seem to look into
whether the segregated funds were an effective alternative. The
Court seemed content with the simple existence of the alternatives.
The Court thus seemed to apply a more deferential standard of
review, something akin to intermediate scrutiny.
As discussed, Austin and Walters provide a model of the proper
standard of review for campaign finance reform measures under a
property analysis. Campaign finance measures must promote the
state's interest in preventing the distorting effects of aggregated
wealth on the electoral process. The courts should ensure the
213. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).
214. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47.
215. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 661.
216. Id. at 660.
217. Id.
218. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 (2006).
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means are adequately tailored to prevent too great a restriction on
access to lawful speech, but the courts should be deferential to the
judgment of the legislatures as the legislatures are more competent
to set the restrictions on the use of political money. This standard
would allow for fairly low contribution limits and also for moder-
ately leveled expenditure limits for candidates. Expenditure
ceilings set too low for effective campaigning would themselves dis-
tort the electoral process by eliminating competition. Independent
expenditure ceilings could be set even lower, as they have a signifi-
cantly smaller place in the electoral process than candidate
expenditures.
Overall, this standard would allow legislatures to pass reforms to
reduce escalating campaign costs. This standard would free elected
officials to be more responsive to constituents, both by making the
officials less dependent on big donors and by freeing them of time-
consuming fundraising. Courts also would be able to extricate
themselves from the midst of the campaign finance debates. Courts
would no longer sit as superlegislatures, but would instead set the
limits of campaign reform, stepping in when legislatures intruded
too far into political money property interests. However, the courts
would otherwise defer to the legislature's judgment on the elec-
toral process. Doctrinal realignment of campaign finance issues to
a property analysis would significantly improve the campaign fi-
nance system.
CONCLUSION
The doctrinal misallocation of campaign finance measures has
hampered reform efforts for over thirty years now. The time has
come for the Court to realize the effects of its over-protection of
speech interests related to the money in politics. Political money is
more akin to property that incidentally affects speech than vice
versa. The Court has allowed the entrenchment of the moneyed
elite through its bizarre equation of money and speech long
enough. In the words ofJustice Stevens, "[m] oney is property; it is
not speech."219
219. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens,J., concurring).
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